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INTRODUCTION 
Almost all children are online in the Western World. The Inter-
net has become an intrinsic part of their everyday lives, wherever they 
are. To use their computer devices, download apps, surf the web, enjoy 
music and vlogs, post messages on social media, and participate as a citi-
zen in modern society, and so on, children continuously give and give off 
crumbs and chunks of their own personal data to businesses, govern-
ments, and other individuals. In many contexts, sharing personal data is 
subject to the consent of the person concerned and in more and more sit-
uations that person is a minor, i.e. a person who has not yet reached the 
age of majority. The concept of consent is wrought with issues and as a 
result, we might question the effectiveness and even fairness of consent 
as a means for children to exercise privacy and data protection rights in 
the digital world. In addition, given the growing complexity of personal 
data processing, we need to consider whether it is necessary to recali-
brate the balance between autonomy and protection, which are key in 
giving meaning to children‘s rights in theory and practice. Moreover, it is 
important to develop tools for meaningful and secure participation of 
children in the digital world that allow them to adequately retain control 
over their personal data, or at least make more informed choices in their 
daily digital lives—or ―onlives,‖ which is a fitting term given the hyper-
connectedness in and of todays‘ world.1 
This article analyzes the concept of children‘s consent in the dig-
ital world from the perspective of the rights-based approach as propagat-
ed by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (hereinafter 
UN CRC or Convention).2 The article will particularly analyze the distri-
bution of consent decisions between minors and parents with respect to 
online processing of personal data through the three conceptual lenses of 
protection, participation/ emancipation, and development of children to 
                                                     
 1 See THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO, BEING HUMAN IN A HYPERCONNECTED ERA (Luciano Floridi ed. 
2015). 
 2 G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention of the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989). 
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adulthood, which are fundamental to the rights-based approach of the 
Convention.3 Taking this multidimensional perspective towards chil-
dren‘s consent and the ways in which it has been regulated in United 
States and European Union law provides a considerably richer and sig-
nificantly more balanced view on children‘s consent in the digital world 
than merely viewing such issues from the protection paradigm that is 
currently at the heart of the debate. 
The article starts out with briefly characterizing today‘s data-
intensive digital world, in which children and teens grow up, by focusing 
on the trends of datafication, hyperconnectivity, and commercialization, 
and the (potential) effects these trends may have on children‘s lives. Sub-
sequently, in Part II, the article sets out the legal notion of consent and 
how consent has been regulated in the United States and the European 
Union. Part III sets out the rights-based approach under the Convention, 
before analyzing the legal approaches to consent in light of the three 
conceptual lenses that underpin the rights-based approach. First, chil-
dren‘s consent is analyzed through the lens of protection, and addresses 
whether children need protection and to what extent their parents or 
caregivers will provide such protection. This part demonstrates various 
issues that make consent problematic as an effective and fair means of 
exercising privacy and data protection rights. Second, the law on chil-
dren‘s consent is considered through the lens of participation and eman-
cipation. To what extent have the rights of children been sufficiently re-
spected in the law on children‘s consent? Third, the adequacy of the law 
on children‘s consent is tested in terms of the optimal development of 
children. To what extent and how can children‘s basic needs to make 
sound decisions on personal data processing in today‘s digital world be 
accommodated? Part IV then presents the conclusions of the analysis and 
some recommendations for potential ways forward in addressing the 
challenges raised by the rights-based analysis of children‘s consent. 
I. CHILDREN IN A DATA-INTENSIVE, HYPERCONNECTED AND 
COMMERCIAL DIGITAL WORLD 
Youth of today grow up in a data-intensive digital world that is 
characterized by a number of trends. These trends impact their lives in 
ways that can, as yet, only partly or hardly be foreseen. To set the scene 
                                                     
 3 Gerison Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child, UNICEF INNOCENTI RESEARCH 
CENTRE, 3 (2005), http://unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/evolving-eng.pdf. 
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for this article‘s further analysis, this section will briefly address the mu-
tually reinforcing tendencies of datafication, hyperconnectivity, and 
commercialization, and briefly go over some—actual and potential—
consequences thereof. 
A. DATAFICATION 
The amount of personal data that is processed on the internet has 
exponentially grown in recent times and will go on to increase rapidly in 
the future. Basically, three types of data can be distinguished as part of 
the growing data intensity. First, some of that data is given or published 
by the individuals themselves. If children open an account to play in the 
online virtual world Minecraft, they need to register with their e-mail ad-
dresses and birth dates, as well as submit payment details to buy the 
software that actually allows them to enter this blocky online world.4 In-
timate personal information and creative content, such as pictures and 
videos, are shared on various social media. Such personal data will be 
given more or less consciously, meaning children can contemplate 
whether they indeed want to share certain information and whom in their 
circle of family, friends, and others they want to share it with. 
Second, just by being and acting online through computers and 
mobile devices, such as tablets and smart phones, a lot of personal data 
is—mostly unconsciously or unknowingly—given off.5 When surfing the 
web individuals leave digital traces by clicking from link to link in 
search engines, online stores, on social media, and so on. This is also 
called behavioral data; how individuals behave on the internet can be 
meticulously documented by using technologies, such as tracking cook-
ies6, web beacons7 and device or browser fingerprinting.8
,9 People also 
                                                     
 4 See generally MINECRAFT, https://minecraft.net/nl/store/minecraft/#register (last visited Oct. 15, 
2016). 
 5 ERVIN GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE,10-46 (1956); B. Van den 
Berg, The Situated Self: Identity in a World of Ambient Intelligence, 168 (Apr. 23, 2009) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University of Rotterdam). 
 6 See generally HTTP Cookie, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_cookie (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2016) (definition of a ―cookie.‖).  
 7 See Generally, Web Beacon, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_beacon (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2016). 
 8 See Generally Device Fingerprint, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 9 Tools exist to visualize your tracking and tracing. See e.g. PANOPTICLICK, 
https://panopticlick.eff.org/about (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); Add-ons, LIGHTBEAM FOR FIREFOX 
BY MOZILLA, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/lightbeam/ (last visited Oct. 15, 
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give out a lot of data that is (potentially) very personal both on the web 
and on by using apps on mobile devices, such as smart phones. These 
apps offer a wide range of services that cover many aspects of our pro-
fessional and personal daily lives, such as communications with family, 
friends and others, day-to-day schedules and activities, our innermost 
thoughts, news reading and other habits, exercise and health information, 
and entertainment preferences. As a smart phone commercial fittingly 
states about whatever you want to do or are interested in: ―There‘s an 
app for that.‖10 App users are not only sharing data, including personal 
data, with the app companies, but also—and sometimes too extensively 
and despite promises to the contrary—with third parties, or when apps 
are not in use.11 Data given off—or observed data—does not merely con-
sist of content, i.e. communications, social media posts, pictures and vid-
eo‘s et cetera, but also of metadata, i.e. data about data. Metadata in-
cludes, for example, meta-information about your smart phone, such as 
MAC-address, usage, social connections, how often you call whom, 
when and where, and other location data.12 
Based on such metadata, individuals can be uniquely identified 
by their smart phones.13 This brings us to the third category of data, i.e. 
inferred data, or new data that is derived from other data. Captured by 
the buzzword ‗big data,‘ the trend of datafication is augmented by so-
phisticated and real-time automated data analysis through algorithms.14 
The data given and given off—and other data—are captured, processed, 
and then analyzed with algorithms, which results in new knowledge con-
sisting of patterns and correlations. Therefore, knowledge about someone 
can be inferred that was perhaps not disclosed by individuals because 
                                                     
2016) (product for purchase which enables the buyer to see ―the first and third party sites you in-
teract with on the Web‖). 
 10 See Sesame Street: There’s an App for That (PBS broadcast Nov. 3, 2010) You will be able to 
find the relevant clip on Youtube. Sesame Street, Sesame Street Song: There’s an App for That, 
YOUTUBE https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhkxDIr0y2U (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
 11 ANTOINE PULTIER ET AL., SINTEF, PRIVACY IN MOBILE APPS: MEASURING PRIVACY RISKS IN 
MOBILE APPS 9 (2016); FINN LÜTZOW-HOLM MYRSTAD ET AL., FORBURKER RADET, APPFAIL: 
THREATS TO CONSUMERS IN MOBILE APPS 41-43 (2016), 
http://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/2015/appfail-threats-to-consumers-in-mobile-apps/. 
 12 See Phillip Branch, Metadata and the Law: What your Smartphone Really Says About You, THE 
CONVERSATION (Mar. 2, 2014), https://theconversation.com/metadata-and-the-law-what-your-
smartphone-really-says-about-you-23827. 
 13 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Priacy Bounds of Human Mobili-
ty, NATURE.COM (Mar. 25, 2013) http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376. 
 14 CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS, HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 204 
(2012).; VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 78 (Eamon Dolan ed., 2014). 
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they perceived it as too personal to share online. Based on Facebook 
―likes,‖ personality traits (openness, intelligence) and personal attributes 
(gender, sexual orientation, political orientation, ethnic origin) can be 
predicted with high accuracy, even if the ―likes‖ themselves do not  re-
veal the trait or attribute.15 In a 2014 Stanford University study, two 
computer science students found that analyses of telephone metadata 
produces extremely sensitive information about individuals, such as 
medical information, political and religious associations, and sexual in-
terests.16 The researchers contend that their study involved merely simple 
inferences.17 Obviously, more advanced data analytics can yield even 
more sophisticated outcomes. The end of what technologies can do with 
data in all its colorful varieties and forms, either in collecting, pro-
cessing, or enhancing it, is nowhere near in sight. Moreover, the datafica-
tion trend is amplified by an increasing hyperconnectivity of individuals 
and artifacts. 
B. HYPERCONNECTIVITY 
Hyperconnectivity essentially denotes the trend of an increasing 
number of individuals and artifacts continuously being connected 
through networked, digital technologies. In a relatively brief period of 
time, we have come a long way from computers connecting the first peo-
ple across the network of networks to a world in which each person is 
digitally connected. In addition, increasingly the physical things that sur-
round us—such as thermostats, television, and washing machines—are 
able to join us online to increase the efficacy of organizational processes 
and make our lives more convenient. These interconnected physical ob-
jects turn into ―smart devices‖ when they start tracking and predicting 
our behavior to cater to our preferences and needs (or those of others). 
The ―internet of people‖ and ―internet of things‖ become more and more 
intertwined, and even merge when individuals equip themselves with 
wearables that incorporate electronics and sensors to track their move-
                                                     
 15 Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of 
Human Behavior, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATI‘L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 5802-05, 1 
(2013). 
 16 Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, WEB 
POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-
telephone-metadata/. 
 17 Id. 
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ments, bodily data, and emotional or mental status.18 Needless to say, the 
hyperconnectivity of individuals and objects brings about a greater data-
intensity than ever before. The internet of things increasingly harbors de-
vices that are particularly meant for children, such as smart toys. In 2015, 
toy company Mattel started shipping Hello Barbie, a WIFI-enabled smart 
Barbie doll that records and analyzes children‘s (and any other) conver-
sations to find out about their interests and preferences (and potentially 
other things).19 Eavesdropping on children at play was perceived as a 
bridge too far and a petition has been launched to ―say goodbye to ‗Hello 
Barbie.‘‖20 
C. COMMERCIALIZATION 
Underlying the previously mentioned tendencies is the commer-
cialization of children‘s everyday lives. The digital world is a highly 
commercialized world that is predominantly constructed and scripted by 
companies to serve their economic interests. A strong motivator behind 
both datafication and hyperconnectivity, and particularly the combination 
of both, is to considerably improve businesses‘ understanding of actual 
and potential customers in order to better target their products and ser-
vices and increase profits.21 Children are important targets for the market-
ing industry for three reasons: they have (increasingly more) money to 
spend; children influence family spending; and children are future con-
sumers.22 Research organizations specialized in marketing to children 
have developed sophisticated strategies focused on different stages of 
child development, which already include babies and toddlers.23 In the 
digital world, marketing to children has changed considerably as com-
pared to traditional advertising in magazines and on television. As Mont-
gomery, Grier and Dorfman describe: 
                                                     
 18 See e.g. Nic Fleming, Know Thyself: The Quantified Self Devotees Who Live by Numbers, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2011) https://www.theguardian.com/science/2011/dec/02/psychology-
human-biology. 
 19 Stop Mattel’s “Hello Barbie” Eavesdropping Doll, CAMPAIGN FOR A COMMERCIAL-FREE 
CHILDHOOD (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/action/stop-
mattel%E2%80%99s-hello-barbie-eavesdropping-doll. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See e.g., Jerry Daykin, Personalised Marketing at Scale is the Next Big Thing in Digital, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media-
network/2015/mar/19/personalised-marketing-digital-future. 
 22 PATTI VALKENBURG,  SCHERMGAANDE JEUGD: OVER JEUGD EN MEDIA 166 (2014). 
 23 Id. At 165. 
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Unlike television, where children‘s exposure to commercials is lim-
ited to brief intervals during the times when they are viewing the pro-
grams, digital marketing is now woven into the fabric of young peo-
ple‘s daily experiences, integrated not only into their media content 
but also into their social and personal relationships. Young people are 
not just viewing content but also inhabiting media environments 
where entertainment, communication, and marketing are combined in 
a seamless stream of compelling sounds and images.24 
Marketing has increasingly become more integrated in our of-
fline and, particularly, online environments. In addition, the line between 
information, entertainment, and play versus marketing has blurred. Since 
individuals can too easily ignore or skip advertising when it is recog-
nizable as such, marketing strategies are focused on hiding commercial 
messages and manipulating individual persons unconsciously.25 Adver-
games are a case in point—advergames include online games that aim to 
stimulate brand awareness, without necessarily showing the brand or the 
products that are sold under a particular brand as part of the game.26 Ad-
vergames may involve colorful and fun characters that highly appeal to 
children and are used in supermarkets to sell food, especially sweets and 
snacks such as ice cream, cereals, and cookies. Research has shown that 
commercialization has negative effects on children by inducing material-
istic values in children, encouraging negative relations between child and 
parent, and exacerbating unhealthy lifestyles and health problems (e.g. 
obesity, eating disorders) for children.27 It begs the question, how are the-
se emerging invasive and difficult-to-escape marketing practices fair to 
children.28 
Commercialization of children‘s ―onlives‖ is significantly aug-
mented by other modes of manipulation that go with these advanced 
marketing strategies. Datafication practices are part of a carefully orches-
trated game plan, in which internet companies immerse users in interac-
                                                     
 24 Kathryn C. Montgomery et al., The New Threat of Digital Marketing, 59 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF 
N. AM. 659, 660 (2012). 
 25 See e.g., Mind Control Theories and Techniques Use by Mass Media, THE VIGILANT CITIZEN 
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://vigilantcitizen.com/vigilantreport/mind-control-theories-and-techniques-
used-by-mass-media/. 
 26 AGNES NAIRN & HAIMING HANG, FAMILY AND PARENTING INSTITUTE, ADVERGAMES: IT‘S NOT 
CHILD‘S PLAY 5 (2012) http://www.agnesnairn.co.uk/policy_reports/advergames-its-not-childs-
play.pdf. 
 27 See VALKENBURG, supra note 22. 
 28 ISOLDE SPRENKELS & IRMA VAN DER PLOEG, Follow the Children! Advergames and the Enact-
ment of Children’s Consumer Identity, in MINDING MINORS WANDERING THE WEB, 
REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY 173 (Simone van der Hof et al. eds. 2014). 
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tive digital environments and nudge them to disclose their innermost 
thoughts and feelings as well as forecast inclinations and contingencies 
that shed a new light on the ways in which we are attracted to potential 
objects of interest. Corporate surveillance is the default in many of the 
apps and online services that children use because it presents the founda-
tion on which most of these companies are built and, hence, their design 
is tweaked, tuned, and tested meticulously to produce the best results.29 
What at face value seems like an innocent sharing of stories with loved 
ones to the users is therefore big business to the service providers. Most 
of the ways in which users are played happens unconsciously and often-
times invisibly. As Sprenkels and Van der Ploeg write when addressing a 
particular advergame, ―this clever design consists of putting ‗reading 
clues‘ about fun and play in the foreground while remaining silent on 
processes, activities and intentions in the background.‖30 
Sometimes, such manipulative practices surface in the media and 
might even result in—often short-lived—public commotion. This hap-
pened, for example, when Facebook‘s secret mood experiment, which 
had been carried out without the user‘s informed consent, surfaced in a 
research paper.31 Oftentimes, data processing might go beyond our ex-
pectations of what we think is necessary or justified. Why, for instance, 
does the flashlight app on your smartphone need access to your contacts 
list?32 And, why is an app still transmitting data when it is not in use?33 
Companies that engage in corporate surveillance and user manipulation 
have an intrinsic economic interest in carefully keeping the lid on such 
practices to not undermine their effectiveness or disquiet and alienate us-
ers. This leads to what is called ―invisible visibility,‖ a term coined by 
Esther Keymolen.34 Invisible visibility signifies an increased transparen-
cy of individuals to companies and governments in ways that are com-
                                                     
 29 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA 
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 21–23 (2015). 
 30 Sprenkels & van der Ploeg, supra note 28, at 183. 
 31 Katy Waldman, Facebook’s Unethical Experiment, SLATE (June 28, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/06/facebook_unethical_experime
nt_it_made_news_feeds_happier_or_sadder_to_manipulate.html. 
 32 See John Leyden, This Flashlight App Requires: Your Contacts List, Identity, Access to Your 
Camera. . ., THE REGISTER (Sep. 11, 2014, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/11/mobile_app_privacy_survey/. 
 33 See Pultier et. al., supra note 11. 
 34 Mireille Hildebrandt, Who is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility, in REINVENTING DATA 
PROTECTION? 239, 240 (S. Gutwirth et al. eds. 2009). 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
110 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
pletely opaque to them.35 The consequences are a lack of power for indi-
viduals to—effectively—exercise their rights, including privacy and data 
protection rights, and to hold these organizations accountable for their 
actions. 
The developments described in this section will form the back-
drop against which the law on children‘s consent will be scrutinized from 
a rights-based perspective. First, however, the following sections will 
address the notion of (children‘s) consent and the rights-based approach 
under the UN CRC. 
II. THE NOTION OF CONSENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Consent is a crucial concept in law and society and denotes the 
autonomy of individuals to have control over their lives. To allow indi-
viduals the freedom to make decisions about their lives denotes a shift 
from a paternalistic paradigm to a rights-based paradigm. Beyleveld and 
Brownsword underline the social importance of the concept when stat-
ing: 
[T]hat where a society (and this, it should be emphasised, means 
any society, English or American, African or Asian, common law 
or civilian-based) takes individuals and their choices seriously—
particularly so, perhaps, where social relationships are framed by 
a respect for human rights—the concept of consent will come to 
play a key role in its practical thinking.36 
The next section will show how consent has two interrelated 
functions, which are essential in light of the rights-based approach to be 
discussed in Part IV.1. Subsequently, Part III.3. will set out the particular 
rules that have been introduced on children‘s consent privacy and data 
protection laws in the United States and the European Union. 
B. THE DOUBLE ROLE OF CONSENT 
Notions of autonomy and freedom are inherent in the concept of 
consent in two different ways. Consent is a manifestation of an individu-
al‘s right of freedom under the law, such as human rights law, but con-
                                                     
 35 Simone van der Hof & Esther Keymolen, Shaping Minors with Major Shifts: Electronic Child 
Records in the Netherlands, 15 INFO. POLITY 309, 311 (2010). 
 36 DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW 2–3 (2007). 
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sent also sets in motion the exercise of those rights by individuals and, by 
doing so, can turn activities that would otherwise be a violation of their 
rights into lawful ones.37 
First, consent as a manifestation of rights is evidenced by the in-
dividual‘s right to the integrity of the body, which signifies not only the 
inviolability of the physical body but also the individual freedom to self-
determination over one‘s body.38 Individuals, for instance, have the free-
dom to decide about their bodies being pierced, tattooed, enhanced 
through plastic surgery, or, in more extreme situations, even being in-
flicted pain or humiliation in sadomasochistic settings. From a privacy 
and data protection perspective, the notion of consent is embodied in the 
right to informational self-determination.39 The right to informational 
self-determination is a notion that intrinsic to the value of human dignity 
and the development of the human personality40distinctly puts the indi-
vidual at the center of online activities in which their personal data is 
processed—including any results of such processing, such as profiles, are 
used41—for whatever purposes. Under the rights to informational self-
determination, ―a situation that should clearly be avoided was to create 
feelings to the individuals of complete loss of control over the infor-
mation that is collected about them.‖42 
Privacy epitomizes many different conceptions, one of which is 
the claim of having control over our personal information by being able 
to decide who does or does not have access to that information.43 The 
right to informational self-determination particularly captures ―the au-
thority of the individual to decide himself, on the basis of the idea of 
                                                     
 37 See id.; see also Bart W. Schermer, Bart H.M. Custers & Simone van de Hof, The Crisis of Con-
sent, How Stronger Legal Protection may Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection, 16 
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 171 (2014). 
 38 See, e.g., RUTH A. MILLER, THE LIMITS ON BODILY INTEGRITY 7–8 (2007) (on bodily integrity 
and consent in sexual relations). 
 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65 BVERFGE 
1, 2008 (Ger.) (the German Constitutional Court holding the right to informational self-
determination was recognized as a part of a general personal right in the 1983 Population Census 
case). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, (General Data Protection Regulation), 
art. 4(4), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 42 ELENI KOSTA, CONSENT IN EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 30 (2013). 
 43 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
112 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
self-determination, when and within what limits information about his 
private life should be communicated to others,‖ and ―that an individual‘s 
control over the data and information produced about him is a (necessary 
but insufficient) precondition for him to live an existence that may be 
said ‗self-determined.‘44 Although the right to informational self-
determination is not yet endorsed as a right in and of itself, it has influ-
enced data protection laws in European countries and augmented the 
pivotal role of consent therein.45 Moreover, it has a broader, social di-
mension that goes beyond the individualist conception of the right as 
―self-determination is an elementary functional condition of a free demo-
cratic society based on its citizen‘s capacity to act and to cooperate.‖46 
Second, consent is a fundamental legal instrument for transform-
ing unlawful conduct into lawful conduct. Consent allows an individual 
to say ―yes‖ or ―no‖ to an action that impacts them personally and thus 
exercise their freedom to self-determination. In addition, by saying ‗yes‘ 
an otherwise unlawful action, that action may even be legalized.47 For in-
stance, hurting a person is, in principle, not acceptable and can be legally 
characterized as physical abuse or even attempted murder depending on 
the severity of the circumstances. A surgeon who operates on a patient, 
however, is not likely to face such consequences if the patient consented 
to the operation. In this way, ―being hurt‖ has been transformed from an 
unlawful action to something perfectly legitimate with the approval of 
the patient. Under European data protection law, consent is codified as 
one of the most important grounds for the lawful processing of personal 
data.48 Unlawful personal data processing—assuming no other legitimate 
grounds for personal data processing apply—is transformed into lawful 
personal data processing through the authorization given by the data sub-
ject.49 Individuals can only provide legally transformative consent when 
the law recognizes their capacity to do so. The next section will discuss 
at what age children are deemed legally capable of consenting to the col-
                                                     
 44 Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poullet, The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Val-
ue of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy, in REINVENTING 
DATA PROTECTION? 45, 51 (S. Gutwirth et al. eds. 2009). 
 45  See id.; see also KOSTA, supra note 42. 
 46 Rouvroy & Poullet, supra note 44, at 53. 
 47 See BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 36; see also Schermer et. al., supra note 37. 
 48 See GDPR supra note 41, art. 6(1)(a), at 36. 
 49 The data subject is an identified or identifiable natural person to whom information relates. See 
GDPR supra note 41, art. 4(1), at 33. 
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lection and use of their personal data in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. 
C. CHILDREN‘S CONSENT 
The extent to which children can legally provide consent de-
pends on the capacity of children to make decisions for themselves in a 
given situation. When they have that capacity, their decisions must be 
respected. If they lack such capacity, the consent of a third party, most 
notably the person with parental authority, will be required. The child‘s 
capacity to consent derives from their level of maturity—do they have 
the cognitive ability to sufficiently understand their position and, hence, 
to give consent? In the landmark case of Gillick, the UK House of Lords 
formulated the capacity to consent as: ―a sufficient understanding and in-
telligence to be capable of making up his own mind on the matter requir-
ing decision‖.50 
In Gillick, the House of Lords determined that in those instances 
where children have that capacity, medical practitioners need indeed to 
ask the child instead of the parent for consent to treatment.51 The level of 
maturity of the child is also reflected in the privacy and data protection 
laws in the US and the EU. Both the US Children‘s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act (hereinafter COPPA)52 and the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (hereinafter GDPR)53 in the European Union hold special provi-
sions on children‘s and parental consent that take into account different 
ages of children. This section will show how children‘s and parental con-
sent has been regulated in both these laws. The purpose of this analysis is 
not to provide a full-blown comparison or a critical assessment of these 
laws, but to focus on the principal characteristics of children‘s consent. 
1. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
In 1998, the federal Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(effective as of April 2000) was introduced in the United States. After a 
review of COPPA by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2010, 
COPPA was amended with the new rule taking effect in July 2013. The 
                                                     
 50 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority  [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013). 
 53 GDPR supra note 41. 
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rationale for the introduction of COPPA was the increasing internet use 
of children that enabled marketing companies to compile lists of chil-
dren‘s personal information and behavioral data that were subsequently 
sold to third parties.54 Interestingly, privacy concerns were not the only 
driving force behind the introduction of the act; potential online safety 
risks, such as (online) predators getting their hands on children‘s person-
al data, were also perceived as very worrisome after investigative reports 
demonstrated the ease with which mailing lists consisting of children‘s 
personal information could be obtained from marketing companies.55 
COPPA was codified in and has been implemented by 16 C.F.R. Part 
312 and violations of the rule are considered unfair or deceptive trade 
practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.56 
The COPPA rule stipulates that commercial online service pro-
viders must obtain verifiable parental consent57 before personal infor-
mation of children is collected, used or disclosed,58 as well as after mate-
rial changes have been made to the data processing practices.59 Children 
are defined as individuals under the age of 13.60 The online services must 
either be directed to children or service providers, and must have actual 
knowledge that they are collecting personal information from children 
below 13. Hence, general audience websites or apps must also comply 
with the rule if they know they are collecting data from children below 
13.61 Parental consent must be verifiable, which entails that prior to the 
collection of personal information of the child, any reasonably effort 
(taking into account the technological state of the art)62 must be made to 
ensure that the parent of the child: (1) is informed of the personal data 
processing practices by the online service provider; and (2) authorizes 
                                                     
 54 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/kids/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2014). 
 57 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c) (for exceptions to parental consent). 
 58 Personal information is ―individually identifiable information about an individual collected 
online.‖ 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (further specifying personal information by providing examples of 
personal information). 
 59 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1). 
 60 16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
 61  As a result, children under 13 are often banned from online services. See e.g., Under 13 Year 
Olds on Facebook: Why do 5 Million Kids Log in if Facebook Doesn’t Want Them to? REUTERS 
(Sep. 9, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/19/under-13-year-olds-on-
facebook_n_1898560.html. 
 62 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b) (identifying mechanisms for verifiable parental consent). 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
Vol. 34, No. 2 I agree…or do I? 115 
those practices.63 Finally, there needs to be an element of choice when it 
comes to the sharing of personal data with third parties; parents should 
be able to consent to the collection and use of their child‘s personal in-
formation by the online service provider, without also authorizing the 
disclosure of that personal information to third parties.64 Furthermore, the 
COPPA rule allows parents to refuse the further or future processing of 
their child‘s personal information and tell the online service provider to 
destroy personal information that has been collected so far.65 Upon such 
refusal, the online service provider can end any service provided to the 
child.66 
B. General Data Protection Regulation 
In 2016, the General Data Protection Regulation was adopted67 
by the European Union Council and Parliament to both invigorate respect 
for the right to personal data protection as a fundamental right,68 and sus-
tain the development and strengthening of the internal (digital) market 
through the free movement of personal data.69 Its predecessor, the Per-
sonal Data Protection Directive, did not contain specific provisions on 
the protection of children‘s personal data.70 It was thus up to member 
states to regulate on their own. As a result, law on the capacity of minors 
to consent to personal data processing by online service providers im-
parts quite a diversified picture. The minimum age to consent to personal 
data processing varies in the European Union—ranging from 14 to 16 
years.71 Moreover, the validity of consent may depend on the circum-
stances of a particular situation.72 In some instances, children might be 
expected to better deal with such decisions than in other times, allowing 
                                                     
 63  16 C.F.R. § 312.2. 
 64 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2). 
 65  16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2). 
 66  16 C.F.R. § 312.6(c). 
 67 Taking effect as of May 2018. GDPR supra note 41. 
 68 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 [hereinafter 
Charter of Rights]. 
 69 GDPR supra note 41, at 1. 
 70 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 71 Terri Dowty & Douwe Korff, Protecting the Virtual Child: The Law and Children’s Consent to 
Sharing Personal Data, ARCH (Jan. 2009), http://medconfidential.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Protecting-the-virtual-child.pdf. 
 72 See id. 
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a more flexible application of legal capacity rules. Obviously, the intro-
duction of the GDPR offered a perfect opportunity to unify the age of 
majority for the legal capacity of children to consent to online personal 
data processing across Europe. Remarkably, however, it still allows 
member states to run their own course in this respect, which means legal 
diversity in this area may essentially be perpetuated. 
In the GDPR, ‗consent‘ is defined as: 
[A]ny freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of 
the data subject‘s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a 
clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of per-
sonal data relating to him or her.73 
The GDPR sets out specific conditions for children‘s consent in relation 
to commercial online service providers74 in article 8.75 Oddly enough, 
‗child‘ is not defined in the GDPR.76 Although the obvious definition for 
the word ―child‖ is provided by the UN CRC, omitting the definition 
from the GDPR is regrettable. With respect to children‘s consent, the 
GDPR takes a graduated approach. Children have legal capacity to con-
sent to commercial services offered directly to them when they are at 
least 16 years old.77 Below the age of 16, consent must, in those instanc-
es, be given or authorized by the holder of parental responsibility over 
the child. Member states, however, have the possibility to set a lower age 
for the legal capacity of children to consent to personal data processing, 
as long as the age is not below 13 years old.78 Both in the original pro-
posal of the European Commission and the one that was adopted by the 
European Parliament, the age was set at 13 years old. However, the 
council then chose to leave it to EU or national laws to determine the age 
for the legal capacity of minors to consent to personal data processing. 
                                                     
 73 GDPR supra note 41, art. 4(11), at 34; see also GDPR supra note 41, art. 7, at 37 (identifying the 
conditions for consent); see also Schermer et. al., supra note 37 (on the requirements for valid 
consent). See also infra Section IV.4.1 (further elaborating on the conditions). 
 74 Or ‗information society services‘ as they are commonly called in EU law. See GDPR supra note 
41, art. 4(25), at 35. 
 75  GDPR supra note 41, art. 8, at 37. 
 76 An earlier draft of the GDPR did, however, define a ‗child‘ as any person below the age of 18 
years. It is unclear why the definition has later been omitted, but it might be due to differences 
between the legal systems of the member states. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
at 43, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). See also GDPR, supra note 41, art. 4, at 33. 
 77  GDPR, supra note 41, art. 8(1), at 37. 
 78  Id. 
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Hence, the provision in the final version of the GDPR clearly appears to 
be a compromise that came out of the trilogue between Parliament and 
Council.79 Consequently, age differences in the EU might unfortunately 
continue to exist. 
III. RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S CONSENT 
A. THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH UNDER THE UN CRC 
The adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
November 1989 signified a paradigm shift from a welfare-based ap-
proach towards a rights-based approach with respect to children. Chil-
dren have long been treated as the objects of adult protection rather than 
as the subjects of (human) rights and the UN CRC has not only put for-
ward a holistic rights-based approach, but, in doing so, also has given 
children a voice and, therefore, a confirmed—albeit still a minor—
position in society. The recognition of children as rights holders in and of 
themselves—rather than ―mere‖ persons in need of protection through 
child-specific measures—forms the foundational rationale of the UN 
CRC.80 
The rights-based approach is particularly rooted in the general 
principles of the CRC, the purpose of which is to guide the interpretation 
of the rights of the child in particular situations. The next section will 
briefly set out these principles. Subsequently, Section IV.3. introduces 
the three conceptual lenses that more specifically embody this rights-
based approach, and will be used as analytical frames for exploring chil-
dren‘s consent in light of the challenges posed by the digital world. 
                                                     
 79 A trilogue is an informal negotiation between representatives of the European Parliament and the 
European Council of Ministers with the aim of reaching an overall agreement on any differences 
that have arisen between Parliament and Council during the legislative procedure. See Fabio 
Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, Explaining Negotiations in the Conciliation Committee, 14 EUR. 
UNION POL. 345, 348 (2013). 
 80 TON LIEFAARD, DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY OF CHILDREN IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW AND STANDARDS 28 (2008). 
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B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The UN CRC is based on four fundamental principles that are 
distinguished as such by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,81 
and must be taken into account in the interpretation and the implementa-
tion of the (other) rights of the child.82 These four pillars are the principle 
of non-discrimination (article 2), the right to life and development (arti-
cle 6), the right to be heard (article 12) and the best interest of the child 
(article 3). 
The principle of non-discrimination entails an obligation for 
State Parties to ―respect and ensure the rights set forth in the convention 
to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any 
kind.‖83 The principle does not imply that all children need to be treated 
identically.84 Indeed, different cases may require different remedies to 
fulfill the rights of a child. For example, children that for particular rea-
sons are more vulnerable to online risks than others, may need more care 
and support than children of a similar age that are better capable to navi-
gate the intricacies of the digital world. Hence, state parties must ―identi-
fy individual children and groups of children the recognition and realiza-
tion of whose rights may demand special measures.‖85 
Still, however, the same rights would apply to each of them and 
their specific situations—albeit with likely different implementations. 
Corporate surveillance that is augmented by datafication and hypercon-
nectivity (see Part I) unmistakably touches upon issues of (non-
)discrimination, given that the—invisible—underlying processes of data 
processing and knowledge creation enable social sorting, i.e. systemati-
cally categorizing and classifying individuals for purposes of identifica-
tion or risk assessment.86 Social sorting can create and reinforce social 
differences, for instance, by excluding the economically deprived from 
commercial services or by targeting certain minority groups in society 
                                                     
 81 See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003) on General Measures of 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), ¶12, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003). 
 82 LIEFAARD, supra note 80, at 69. 
 83 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 81, at ¶12. 
 84 Both the principles of interpretation laid down in articles 3(1) and 5 UN CRC allow room for 
diversity.  See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at arts. 3(1), 5. 
 85 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 81, at ¶12. 
 86 DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK AND AUTOMATED 
DISCRIMINATION (2002) [hereinafter LYON, SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING]; DAVID LYON, 
SURVEILLANCE AFTER SNOWDEN (2015) [hereinafter LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SNOWDEN]. 
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with heightened police or intelligence monitoring.87 Undoubtedly, social 
sorting can have an effect on children‘s lives, either directly, when chil-
dren are at risk or perceived as risks to society,88
 
or indirectly through 
their parents or others close to them as well. 
The child‘s right to life89 puts forward an obligation of state par-
ties to guarantee, amongst others, a child‘s optimal development. A term 
that according to the CRC Committee, must be ―interpret[ed] in its 
broadest sense as a holistic concept, embracing the child‘s physical, men-
tal, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development.‖90 Personal 
development arguably also includes the right to (informational) self-
determination (or control over personal information that constructs and 
determines their (digital) identities) and, hence, is related to the right to 
privacy. Interestingly enough, in their seminal article, Warren and 
Brandeis have connected the right to life to their conception of privacy 
stating, ―[N]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy 
life—the right to be let alone.‖91 Still other conceptions of privacy have 
an impact on the development of a child‘s self or personal identity by al-
lowing them the freedom to manage (limit or allow) access to the self 
which, for instance, allows children to create their own spaces in which 
their thoughts, opinions and identities can unfold without the prying eyes 
of their parents or others.92 The right to privacy, however, also encom-
passes the right to protection of the integrity of personality, both in terms 
of respecting a person‘s individuality and reputation,93 as well as ac-
knowledging and respecting their capacity to choose (to decide or act in a 
certain way) for themselves.94 Moreover, privacy allows children to have 
social relationships of different natures by being more intimate with 
some than others, which can again be conducive to both the construction 
                                                     
 87 See LYON, SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING, supra note 86. 
 88 Van der Hof & Keymolen, supra note 35 at 320. 
 89 The right to live encompasses survival and healthy development and, therefore, denotes more 
than the right to live as such. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 6; 
see also discussion on development infra Section IV.3. 
 90 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, supra note 81, at ¶12. 
 91 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 92 See SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 79, 99. 
 93 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 16. 
 94 See SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 85. 
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and expression of a child‘s identity.95 For example, privacy (or private 
spaces) are paramount to the evolving sexual identity of children.96 
The child‘s right to be heard not only includes a substantive 
right of children who are capable of forming views to express those 
views freely, but also acknowledges that the views of children must be 
taken into account for decision-making to be in line with the UN CRC.97 
The right to be heard underlies children‘s participation in their decision-
making and a free and open society more generally. Relatedly, the right 
to be heard is intrinsically connected to the right to privacy, given that 
the protection of privacy creates a space for individuals to read, think, 
and discuss ideas without any form of (corporate, government or any 
other form of) surveillance. This is what Richards calls intellectual pri-
vacy,98 a conception of privacy which has become imperative—and in-
creasingly less obvious—in the age of digital surveillance, given that be-
fore: ―The state, market, and our social contacts could not monitor our 
thoughts, our reading habits, and our private conversations, at least not in 
an efficient, comprehensive, and unobtrusive way.‖99 
Clearly, all that has changed in today‘s world. Moreover, the 
right to be heard evidently is much related to the right to life and devel-
opment, given that they can mutually reinforce each other. 
Finally, the best interest of the child forms one of the fundamen-
tal values of the UN CRC enshrined particularly in article 3, which 
states, ―in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public 
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative au-
thorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration” (article 3). 
The principle is held deliberately vague in the Convention—and 
no definition has been given in the UN CRC—in order to allow for di-
versified and tailor-made implementations of the concept.100 As the CRC 
Committee states in its General Comment dedicated to this principle: 
                                                     
 95 See SOLOVE, supra note 43, at 85. 
 96 Alisdair A. Gillespie, Adolescents, Sexting and Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 624–
25 (2013). 
 97 AISLING PARKES, CHILDREN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE RIGHT OF THE 
CHILD TO BE HEARD 2 (2013). 
 98 NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2015); See also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 393 (2014). 
 99 RICHARDS, supra note 98, at 96. 
 100 Karin Arts, Twenty-Five Years of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Achievements and Challenges, 61 NETH. INT‘L L. REV. 267, 279 (2014). 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
Vol. 34, No. 2 I agree…or do I? 121 
The concept of the child‘s best interests is complex and its content 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. . . . Accordingly, the 
concept of the child‘s best interests is flexible and adaptable. It 
should be adjusted and defined on an individual basis, according to 
the specific situation of the child or children concerned, taking into 
consideration their personal context, situation and needs.101 
Consequently, the best interest principle is flexible enough to adjust to 
novel developments, but at the same time provides little guidance on how 
to ensure children‘s best interests in particular situations. Therefore, it is 
at risk of being easily neglected, overlooked, or outright ignored, particu-
larly in a digital reality that is characterized by other—notably commer-
cial and government—interests that are much more powerful and run 
counter to the interests of children. What is more, online child protection 
measures can be perceived as ―covert efforts to promote the state‘s pow-
er to survey, censor, or even criminalize private citizens‘ acts‖ and, 
hence, might be considered unfavorably.102 
C. THREE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS: PROTECTION, 
EMANCIPATION AND PARTICIPATION, AND DEVELOPMENT 
The rights-based approach of the UN CRC provides a fundamen-
tal basis when applied rigorously to any measure or action concerning a 
child. This approach as encapsulated by the four fundamental pillars of 
the CRC is embedded in the conceptual frameworks of development, 
participation or emancipation, and protection.103 These frameworks will 
be used as the lenses for the further analysis of children‘s consent in or-
der to ensure a balanced approach towards addressing data protection is-
sues involving children. This section will briefly introduce each of these 
frameworks. 
First, protection is an important objective of the UN CRC in 
light of children‘s vulnerable position in society. Although children‘s 
rights law has shifted from taking a needs-based approach to a rights-
based approach with the adoption of the UN CRC, protecting children 
                                                     
 101 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment no. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to 
Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3, para. 1), ¶32, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/GC/14 (May 29, 2013). 
 102 Sonia Livingstone & Brian O‘Neill, Children’s Rights Online: Challenges, Dilemmas, and 
Emerging Directions, in MINDING MINORS WANDERING THE WEB 19, 21 (Simone van der Hof 
et al. eds., 2014). 
 103 See GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF INNOCENTI RES. CTR., THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE 
CHILD  15 (2005), http://unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/evolving-eng.pdf. 
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against harm naturally is still an essential objective of the Convention 
and its Optional Protocols.104 Children are recognized as rights holders, 
yet the UN CRC also acknowledges that children are human beings in 
development that may have special needs given their lack of experience 
and maturity. Article 19 of the UN CRC provides more generally: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, so-
cial and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while 
in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has 
the care of the child.105 
More specific protective rights are laid down in other provisions 
of the UN CRC.106 Although generally seen as a participation right, the 
child right to privacy also provides a protection right to children. Article 
16 provides: 
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation. 
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.107 
Moreover, the UN CRC recognizes a protection right with re-
spect to the economic exploitation of children, which might be relevant 
in light of the commercialization tendency describes previously (see sec-
tion II.3.). Article 32 (1) provides: 
States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from 
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to 
be hazardous or to interfere with the child‘s education, or to be harm-
ful to the child‘s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social 
development.108 
                                                     
 104  See United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, preamble, opened for signature May 25, 2000, 
T.I.A.S. No. 13094, 2173 U.N.T.S 236 (entered into force Feb. 12 2002); United Nations, Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Pros-
titution and Child Pornography, preamble, opened for signature May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 
13095, 2171 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force on  Jan. 18, 2002). 
 105 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 19. 
 106 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at arts. 32, 37, 38, 40. 
 107 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 16. 
 108 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2, at art. 32(1). 
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Although the article focuses particularly on child labor, treating 
children as the product rather than the customer109 when offering them 
online services can arguably be perceived as a form of economic exploi-
tation as well. 
Second, emancipation and participation entail respecting chil-
dren‘s rights in order for them to develop their capacities and grow up to 
be fully competent and responsible adults. Emancipation more particular-
ly denotes ―the act or fact of gaining equal rights or full social or eco-
nomic opportunities for a particular group.‖110 Participation signifies the 
fact of taking part or being part of something. Clearly, emancipation and 
participation are mutually reinforcing. Allowing children to develop their 
capacities by having their own space in which to enjoy their rights and 
freedoms creates more and more opportunities for participation in social 
life. Therefore, by taking those chances children are becoming wiser and 
more capable of performing actions autonomously. While growing up, 
children surely but slowly gain more freedom to exercise their rights in-
dependently until at the age of majority when the law recognizes them as 
fully capable natural persons. The UN CRC recognizes the importance of 
emancipation and participation most notably in the right to be heard, as 
one of the general principles of the UN CRC. Furthermore and as already 
elaborated in the previous section, recognizing the children‘s right to pri-
vacy and other (related) rights, such as the right to information and the 
right to play, substantially contributes to the emancipation and participa-
tion of children in society, and increasingly happens in a world con-
structed and mediated by digital technologies. 
Third, pursuant to the UN CRC, the optimal development of 
children—in view of their evolving personal autonomy and capacities— 
must be supported by providing them with the basic needs that will fulfill 
their rights.111 Most notably, a significant part of childhood must be dedi-
cated to providing education to children for them to gradually become 
self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant. Importantly, development 
must not just focus on specific children‘s spaces, such as playgrounds, 
                                                     
 109 Based on the phrase ―If you‘re not paying for it, you‘re the product‖ that is often used in relation 
to free social media, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Google and Twitter, the business models of 
which basically entail capitalizing on the user‘s personal data. See blue_beetle, Comment to Us-
er-Driven Discontent, METAFILTER (Aug. 26, 2010, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.metafilter.com/95152/Userdriven-discontent#3256046. 
 110 Liberation, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/liberation (last visited Oct. 20, 
2016). 
 111 LANSDOWN, supra note 103, at 15. 
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and their relations with other children, but should also factor in navi-
gating broader (offline and online) environments and relations with 
adults (and others).112 Developing spaces for children online is particular-
ly important, given that the digital world is inherently focused on grown-
up users and dominated by other interests than those of children—if at all 
recognized—as well as values that do not necessarily align with chil-
dren‘s rights. Consequently, ―real‖ children‘s spaces are increasingly 
disappearing when their worlds become progressively technologically 
mediated, which brings about new and difficult challenges to the opti-
mized development of children. 
Each of the three conceptual frameworks must be considered in 
light of the evolving capacities of the child.113 The protective framework 
is actually based on these evolving capacities, considering that children 
might need protection because they are still humans in development and, 
hence, vulnerable in particular ways. However, it also takes note of the 
fact that children are indeed maturing while growing up and, therefore, 
the levels of protection can be different at various ages. Moreover, 
emancipation and participation rights need to be respected increasingly 
more while children are becoming older and wiser, entailing also that 
parents need to take a step—or several ones—back and give their chil-
dren space to decide for themselves. Finally, the development perspec-
tive should ensure that children are provided the knowledge and instru-
ments to strengthen their position in society, both in childhood and 
emerging adulthood, so they can truly flourish as human beings—now 
and in the future. In conclusion, all three frameworks—although essen-
tial in and of themselves—are mutually dependent (i.e. providing a com-
prehensive approach) and dynamically constituted subject to particular 
circumstances and developments in children‘s lives and society more 
generally. 
D. RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH AND CHILDREN‘S CONSENT IN DATA 
PROTECTION LAW 
This section now turns to the rights-based analysis of the chil-
dren‘s and parental consent provisions, as have been put forward by 
COPPA and GDPR (see section III.3.). The three conceptual lenses set 
out in the previous section will be used to perform that analysis: first the 
                                                     
 112 LANSDOWN, supra note 103, at 19. 
 113 LANSDOWN, supra note 103, at 15. 
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conceptual lens of protection, second emancipation and participation, and 
finally development. 
1. First conceptual lens — Protection 
Protection of children is the rationale for parental consent provi-
sions in data protection law. Datafication—i.e. the collection, processing, 
and use of exponentially increasing amounts of data—impacts adults and 
children in similar ways. Moreover, data processing practices often entail 
manipulative and evocative methods that can be hard to see through for 
individuals. Children are perceived as particularly vulnerable in light of 
these developments and practices.114 The GDPR thus states: 
Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, 
as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards 
concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal 
data. Such specific protection should, in particular, apply to the use of 
personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or creating 
personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with 
regard to children when using services offered directly to a child.115 
The questions raised by the parental consent provisions in terms 
of protection are twofold. First, are children indeed more vulnerable, 
given the data processing practices on the internet and the suggestive 
strategies used by businesses? Second, is the assumption that parents are 
more capable of making decisions than their children a fair one? The 
next two sections will address both these questions to determine whether 
COPPA and GDPR, in fact, achieve their purposes of adequately protect-
ing children. 
a. First assumption: children are vulnerable 
Children are recognized as rights holders under human rights 
law, yet also have a distinctive position given that they are not yet fully 
developed and matured. In other words, they may be vulnerable in ways 
that adults are not and, therefore, protection that is specifically focused 
                                                     
 114 Alexander Roßnagel, Andreas Pfitzmann, Hansjürgen Garstka, MODERNISIERUNG DES 
DATENSCHUTZRECHTS [MODERNIZATION OF PRIVACY LAW], BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DES 
INNERN [FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR] 95 (2001), 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/VortraegeUndArbeitspapiere/2001GutachtenModernisieru
ngDSRecht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.=publicationFile. 
 115 GDPR, supra note 41, at 7. 
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on children is legitimate or even imperative. The age at which children 
are deemed competent can vary widely as a result of the economic, so-
cial, and cultural circumstances in which children live. Moreover, there 
are different, competing theories in developmental psychology about the 
development of children and their capacities.116 What is important here is 
to find out whether there is any evidence on the extent to which children 
are (not) competent to consent to the processing of personal data, and 
whether this is in line with the rules adopted by the COPPA and the 
GDPR. Taking COPPA as an example: is there a magical switch in the 
child‘s brain that turns him or her into a competent person to consent at 
the age of 13? Indeed, adolescence is seen as a period in the child‘s de-
velopment, starting at age twelve, in which the general cognitive capabil-
ities improve and become on a par with those of adults. As Hamilton 
states: ―General cognitive capacity—i.e., the abilities to process infor-
mation, understand and reason from facts, and assess and appreciate the 
nature of a given situation—improves into mid-adolescence. By age six-
teen, these basic cognitive abilities are mature.‖117 
Despite their cognitive capabilities and depending on the context 
in which they need to make decisions, however, adolescents are still 
more likely to engage in irrational and risky behavior compared to adults. 
Adolescents tend to put more weight on benefits than risks and are more 
inclined to make bad decisions in situations that are ―emotionally 
charged and pressured‖, and take well into their twenties to fully mature, 
socially and emotionally.118 
Decisions on consenting to personal data processing practices, 
for instance when opening a social media account or downloading an 
app, are not likely to be emotionally charged or subject to peer pres-
sure,119 and, therefore, children from 12 years on (or even younger) may 
be able to make competent decisions if they are genuinely and fully in-
formed about what is at stake. Children‘s decision-making competence 
                                                     
 116 LANSDOWN, supra note 103, at 16. 
 117 Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1109 (2010). 
 118 Id. at 1110, 1118. 
 119 Peer pressure can of course play a role in the decision to sign up for online services. See Andrew 
Watts, A Teenager’s View on Social Media, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 2, 2015), 
https://backchannel.com/a-teenagers-view-on-social-media-1df945c09ac6 (―[I]f you don‘t have 
Facebook, that‘s . . . weird. . . .  Weird because of the social pressure behind the question, ‗Eve-
ryone has Facebook, why don‘t you?‘‖); see also Grace C. Huang et al., The Interplay of Friend-
ship Networks and Social Networking Sites: Longitudinal Analysis of Selection and Influence Ef-
fects on Adolescent Smoking and Alcohol Use, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 51, 57 (2014) 
(discussing the impact of social media on smoking and alcohol use). 
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tends to be underestimated and cannot be assessed properly without hav-
ing a close look at their everyday lives. Although these are exceptional 
events, young children are found to be capable of making difficult medi-
cal decisions, some of them including matters of life and death.120 
However, the capacity to consent to online data processing prac-
tices cannot be considered independent of the child‘s understanding of 
the underlying commercial interests and calculating processes, and the 
immediate or future consequences thereof for their lives. As Montgom-
ery observes: 
Most users, who are focused on their social experiences in the online 
environment, are likely to remain largely uninformed about the nature 
and extent of commercial surveillance on social networking plat-
forms. These practices have already been woven inextricably into the 
fabric of the new media culture, operating with very little transparen-
cy or public accountability. The breadth and depth of information 
currently generated through these new data collection and measure-
ment tools are unprecedented, and promise to become even more ex-
tensive in the near future. . . . Though young people possess the tools 
and skills for navigating the social media environment, they lack 
some of the critical capacities needed for responding effectively to 
the marketing and data collection apparatus. In the highly commer-
cialized social media landscape, the very features that resonate so 
strongly with adolescent needs—for identity, peer relationships, and 
autonomy—also expose them to techniques that may be particularly 
manipulative and unfair to this age group.121 
Although we might stretch her observations beyond adolescence 
(see the next section), it is likely to be true that most of the intricacies 
and impact of data processing practices are beyond their comprehension 
because they are—technologically, economically, and socially—
complex, not intended to be conspicuous and—at least as far as the con-
sequences are concerned—not readily obvious or—as yet—even un-
known. A study involving Dutch, Greek, and Polish teens between the 
ages of 11-18 found that a majority had never heard of online profiling, 
as a result of which they were not able to form a solid opinion on wheth-
er online profiling was something positive or negative.122 
                                                     
 120 Priscilla Alderson, Young Children’s Health Care Rights and Consent, in THE NEW HANDBOOK 
OF CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS, COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE, 155, 158 (Bob Franklin ed., 2nd 
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b. Second assumption: parents are more capable of making 
decisions 
The notion of consent is essential as a legal instrument in today‘s 
data-intensive digital world in order for individuals to retain control over 
their data and, hence, their ―onlives.‖ Consent as a legal instrument to 
protect and empower individuals, however, is proving increasingly prob-
lematic, and, consequently, questions about the (lack of) effectiveness 
and fairness of consent as a legal instrument are being raised.123 There are 
several reasons why consent is severely challenged as an effective legal 
concept in today‘s digital society, as a result of which it is doubtful that 
parents are actually more capable of making decisions that pertain to per-
sonal data practices than their children. 
In order to be able to adequately exercise the power to consent to 
data processing practices and ensure consent is legitimately given, con-
sent needs to fulfill a number of essential requirements.124 These re-
quirements can also be found in the definition of consent in the GDPR: 
―[A]ny freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of 
the data subject‘s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data 
relating to him or her.‖125 
This definition consists of components that need to safeguard the 
rights of the individual and ensure that the transformation of conduct 
from unlawful to lawful happens in a legally acceptable manner. Consent 
must be freely given, signifying the autonomous position of the individu-
al in the context of personal data processing. Freely given contains an el-
ement of choice; either choosing to have personal data processed or not 
or choosing the conditions for such processing. Obviously, mostly there 
is no choice, other than to opt for not using an app or service, given that 
privacy policies are based on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Parents and chil-
dren might have the option to tweak their privacy settings but those 
changes normally do not affect the default position of corporate surveil-
lance. Consent must be specific, which entails parents saying ―yes‖ to 
clearly defined actions.126 In order to be able to do so, however, parents 
                                                     
 123 See Schermer et al., supra note 37, at 172. 
 124 Schermer et al., supra note 37, at 132. 
 125 See GDPR, supra note 41, art. 4(11). 
 126 Schermer et al., supra note 37 at 173–74. 
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clearly need to have substantial information about the details of data pro-
cessing practices. 
For several reasons, parents are likely to lack such information 
and, hence, consent is seldom specific. Research shows that people most-
ly do not read privacy policies.127 People find them too complicated or 
too long to read.128 Reading them might not be convenient at the moment 
of downloading an app or signing up for an online service. Privacy poli-
cies are generally not very appropriate for small screens. And about 40% 
of the apps do not have a privacy policy.129 Even if parents did read them, 
they might be none the wiser, given that data processing practices are of-
ten disclosed in rather vague terms. Moreover, the processes behind the 
screen are complicated and intentionally opaque, bringing us back to the 
notion of ‗invisible visibility.‘ Not only are the processes by which indi-
viduals become transparent opaque, big data companies do not necessari-
ly have an interest in making those processes more transparent as it 
would undermine their strategies of consumer manipulation (see section 
II.3). Such strategies might, however, be exactly what consumers want to 
know before deciding on whether to use an app or online service. This is 
also implied by the findings from a recent study into the privacy and in-
formation involving US adults.130 In this study, respondents have shared 
their concerns about third-party data sharing of companies, the use of 
personal data for ambiguous and invasive purposes, and data security.131 
Respondents also labeled profiling as ‗creepy,‘ ‗stalking,‘ and ‗big 
brother.‘132 Finally, consent must be unambiguous, which means that par-
ents must overtly act to consent (for example, clicking the box saying 
―confirm‖) or at least consent must be inferred from their actions (for ex-
                                                     
 127 See Irene Pollach, What’s Wrong with Online Privacy Policies?, 50 COMM. OF THE ACM 9, 103–
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ample, clicking through after a message saying ―your name and e-mail 
address will be stored‖ is displayed). Obviously, it is questionable 
whether the act by which consent is given, which in itself can indeed be 
unambiguous, actually amounts to consent as a normatively transforma-
tive action.133 
2. Second conceptual lens — Emancipation and participation 
Where protection has been at the forefront of the children‘s and 
parental consent provisions in COPPA and the GDPR, emancipation and 
participation are implicitly factored in through recognizing the evolving 
capacities of children under 18. The principles of the evolving capacities 
and the best interest of the child, however, denote that values of freedom 
and autonomy must be meticulously balanced with their need for protec-
tion against risk and harm. Admittedly, the interpretation of these princi-
ples is not an easy matter and depends very much on the circumstances 
of a situation as well as concrete weight attached to each of the interests 
involved in the balancing act. Nonetheless, explicitly focusing on what is 
actually in the best interest of the child (as opposed to the interests of 
others) adds interesting perspectives to the equation that may otherwise 
be omitted. 
From a participation and emancipation perspective, the parental 
consent provisions in COPPA and the GDPR can, remarkably enough, be 
perceived as rather problematic in terms of the privacy rights of children. 
The paternalistic approach underlying these provisions raises tensions 
between parents and children in terms of securing private spaces unbe-
knownst to parents. Social media are, for instance, not only a venue for 
teens to socialize with their peers but also to escape from their parents.134 
One of the meanings of privacy for children entails having privacy from 
their parents or—in other words—absence from parents, which is a con-
dition that already surfaces in younger children well before they become 
teens.135 The problem with COPPA and the GDPR is, however, that the 
scope of these laws is restricted in two important ways that can negative-
                                                     
 133 See Schermer et al., supra note 37. 
 134 danah boyd, Taken Out of Context: American Teen Sociality in Networked Publics (Ph.D. dis-
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ly impact the privacy of children in relation to their parents. First, these 
laws apply only to the relations between individuals and organizations 
(such as companies) and interpersonal relationships—such as between 
parents and children—are exempted from or at least not included in their 
application.136 Second, these laws regulate control over personal infor-
mation and not the privacy implications of access to the lives of children, 
which can be effected by giving parents control over their children‘s per-
sonal data.137 What is more, parental consent requirements might actually 
generate or encourage over-extensive parental surveillance.138 These legal 
confinements, therefore, paradoxically engender a lack of suitably recog-
nizing children‘s rights in order to protect their rights. In the GDPR, the 
potentially sensitive relationship between parent and child may have 
been a consideration in making an exemption to the parental consent rule 
in the context of preventive or counselling services offered directly to a 
child.139 This exemption is mentioned only in the considerations of the 
Regulation, yet has not found its way to the actual provisions, most nota-
bly article 8, of the GDPR, which makes its status uncertain. Arguably 
though, the exemption does not in any way seem relevant to children‘s 
―onlives‖ as discussed here and hence, it is doubtful whether privacy 
from parents has been part of the considerations when drafting the provi-
sion. Moreover, recognizing the evolving capacities of the child in set-
ting age limits in both COPPA and GDPR may imply a sensitivity to the 
child‘s right to privacy vis a vis their parents. Instead of being concerned 
with privacy breaches within parent-child relations, however, this recog-
nition also acknowledges the increasing maturity of the child while it 
grows up and of the child‘s ability to make his or her own decisions from 
a certain age. 
Moreover, some might argue that parental consent does not nec-
essarily entail parental access to children‘s ―onlives‖ and, hence, eman-
cipation and participation rights can still be exercised outside parental 
scrutiny. After parental consent has been given to the online service pro-
vider, children can move on by themselves on online platforms they have 
signed up to. Privacy from parents, however, also entails being able to go 
places your parents don‘t know about and requiring parents to say OK at 
                                                     
 136 See 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2012); see also GDPR, supra 41, at art. 2(c). 
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every entrance point of a digital space children want to enter potentially 
increases parental surveillance and essentially violates their emancipa-
tion rights. What is more, parents might even install a password for the 
child and have access to the account at any point in time. In reality, chil-
dren can obviously easily work around all this by not even involving par-
ents when signing up for an online service, since most online service 
providers do not check whether parental consent is necessary or provid-
ed.140 But the point is that this should nonetheless have been taken into 
consideration when drafting these rules. Online service providers‘ prac-
tices may not stay this lenient or indifferent, when the stakes—e.g. 
through stronger enforcement of the rules—are getting higher. 
3. Third conceptual lens — Development 
The development perspective denotes that children must be pro-
vided with the basic necessities to allow them to optimally flourish and 
grow into self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant individuals. Grow-
ing up in modern society demands new and more sophisticated skills as a 
consequence of the tendencies of datafication, hyperconnectivity, and 
commercialization described previously. Such proficiency is also a pre-
requisite to adequately and fairly exercise the capacity to consent to the 
extent possible given the fact that exercising autonomy in a data-intense 
world is innately problematic nowadays. Both COPPA and the GDPR 
contain provisions on notification and information disclosure, requiring 
online service providers to communicate their data processing practices 
with respect to children in a clear, understandable, and unambiguous 
manner.141 In section IV.4.1., however, we have seen that information 
disclosure requirements do not (adequately) instruct internet users on the 
commercial (or other) data processing practices, and, hence, is one of the 
causes for why consent as a legal requirement in privacy and data protec-
tion law fails entirely in effectively protecting them. 
Notwithstanding other difficulties with consent, informed con-
sent would at least call for profound and comprehensive tutoring and 
coaching children and their parents in understanding and navigating the 
tendencies of datafication, hyperconnectivity, and commercialization, 
                                                     
 140 Instead, US online services providers prohibit children under 13 (the age set by COPP) to access 
their online services, as a result of which children lie about their age in order to open an account 
anyway. See Madden et al., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Teens, Social Media, & Privacy, 76-77 
(2013). 
 141 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.4; GDPR, supra note 41, at art. 12. 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
Vol. 34, No. 2 I agree…or do I? 133 
their, actual and potential, impact on them as individuals and society 
more in general, and the instruments available to take—in as far possi-
ble—alternative routes in their onlives from the ones that are economi-
cally dictated. In other words, children must be challenged to reflect on 
what it means to be a digital citizen and consumer, how internet govern-
ance and economics operate and, thus, influence society, and how to 
make fair and versed decisions that are in line with your thoughts, beliefs 
and sentiments, and ensure protection of your rights. The digital world is 
a different world with a dynamic of its own, and unless you have some 
understanding of what it means to live in it, you won‘t be able to take 
matters in your own hands or, at least, grasp the consequences of your 
choices. In their report, the Canadian Public Interest Advocacy Centre 
asserts: 
[We] found that most children found it necessary to limit provid-
ing their private information online to other individuals, but these 
same participants did not perceive there to be many potential risks 
associated with providing personal information in public online 
spaces or to website administrators or corporations they consider 
to be safe, such as Facebook, Webkinz and YouTube. Children 
and teenagers appear to see the online world as an extension of the 
offline world, rather than a separate space with different rules.142 
Moreover, digital citizenship is so much more than understand-
ing how to push the right buttons. Much emphasis is currently put on 
teaching children to code, which certainly has great merits in showing 
them that the digital world is not set in stone and can be manipulated and 
designed differently depending on your preferences, values, or interests. 
At some point, however, tinkering with technology must be associated 
with external, social, and economical, effects that greatly determine 
technological innovation and human lives. This is a daunting task to be 
sure and entails recalibrating what constitutes optimal development in a 
world more and more dominantly mediated by technology. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has set out to scrutinize the protection offered to 
children under the rules on children‘s consent in the United States and 
the European Union privacy and data protection law in light of the rights-
                                                     
 142 PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE, Submission to the Government Consultation on A Digital 
Economy Strategy for Canada (July 2010), 
http://www.combattrelepourriel.gc.ca/eic/site/028.nsf/eng/002171.html#p3.2.3. 
VAN DER HOF_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2017  4:42 PM 
134 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
based approach of the UN CRC. The analysis shows that not only are 
children not properly protected under these provisions, but also the rules 
actually clash with other children‘s rights. Basically, two overall prob-
lems can be identified that need to be addressed in order to establish an 
adequate legal framework that, on the one hand, does justice to funda-
mental rights and values, and, on the other hand, can realistically provide 
protection of these rights and values. 
First, the holistic nature of children‘s rights demands that other 
perspectives are factored in when implementing protective mechanisms 
in the law. Obviously, protecting children and their personal data is in-
creasingly more important in modern society; however, privacy and data 
protection law loses sight of the importance of emancipation, participa-
tion and the development of children to find a healthy balance with re-
spect to the protection paradigm. A too paternalistic approach can curtail 
children‘s participation and emancipation rights in unfair ways. Parents 
definitely have important roles in guiding children, including the respon-
sibility of raising awareness of the challenges of the internet and shield-
ing them from online harm. Even so, new technologies also have a ten-
dency to raise irrational fears and concerns—what are called 
technopanics143—that can lead to overprotective measures by parents, 
which unnecessarily reduce children‘s opportunities for online participa-
tion, effecting their right to be heard, their right to play, and their rights 
to information and association. Furthermore, their right to privacy calls 
for the recognition of having private spaces away from or unbeknownst 
to parents. Involving parents in children‘s entrance to the digital world 
through privacy and data protection laws essentially contradicts such a 
right and negatively impacts its practical implementation. Moreover, by 
failing to effectively take into account the development paradigm, chil-
dren are deprived of the knowledge and instruments to grasp what it 
means to live in an increasingly data-intense, hyperconnected, and com-
mercialized world and how that world can be navigated according to 
their preferences, values, and beliefs. Development rights—even if im-
plemented in a meaningful way—are not likely to resolve the current de-
ficiencies in privacy and data protection law, but to some degree give 
children a more empowered position to cope with the intricacies of digi-
tal society. More generally, we might even question whether the ages set 
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by privacy and data protection law are in keeping with the actual capaci-
ties of children as compared to adults. Based on developmental psychol-
ogy theories, children under 13 (COPPA) or 16 (GDPR) might actually 
be as capable, or as incapable given the context, as their parents in mak-
ing decisions about data processing practices, but this is a matter for fur-
ther research. 
Second, the current rules are no testimony to the protection of 
children‘s—or anyone else‘s for that matter—personal data being taken 
sufficiently seriously. They focus too much on procedural safeguards—
notice and consent—to the detriment of a fundamental assessment of da-
ta processing practices in terms of fairness. Agency of individuals, in-
cluding children, remains important in the digital age and much more—
or even a different approach—is needed than mere consent and infor-
mation disclosure to empower them. Obviously, information disclosure 
rules are an attractive way of regulating for many stakeholders as it is the 
path of least resistance, given that they both support the free market 
principle and intend to promote consumer autonomy and empower-
ment.144 Nonetheless, consent—which typically can be a powerful ―tool‖ 
in accomplishing self-determination—in the privacy and data protection 
context only relays the illusion of autonomy because most of what it 
aims to regulate or achieve is in reality beyond our control. Much of 
what happens under the hood of digital society and the ways in which it 
can potentially impact human lives is, oftentimes deliberately, invisible 
to us and too complicated to understand just like that. Nor can we deter-
mine to what extent data processing practices lead to reasonable and le-
gitimate results—or influence them if they do not. The effects of privacy 
intrusions are usually incremental and the impact may not be readily per-
ceptible.145 Moreover, the tendencies discussed here do not merely bring 
about privacy and data protection issues but also implicate other funda-
mental rights, values, and principles, such as the right to non-
discrimination,146 the right to freedom of expression,147 the right to per-
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sonal development, the presumption of innocence,148 the principle of le-
gal certainty, and the principle of contractual freedom. 
Although corporate surveillance is currently a default setting in 
the way many businesses operate, it does not need to be. In the longer 
term, it might actually turn out to be counterproductive. In the post-
Snowden era, more Americans are concerned about their privacy and the 
loss of control over personal information and are looking for ways to 
protect themselves.149 Not just the internet as such but a secure internet 
may become a basic necessity for individuals, in that it would allow them 
to interact without being observed by those who are not explicitly invit-
ed. Novel decentralized and encryption technologies, such as blockchain
 
might lead the way towards a shift from corporate surveillance towards 
secure online services that are more in accordance with privacy and other 
expectations of individuals, both young and old.150 
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